Great Britain tries to mediate between Germany and Czechoslovakia
The German Ambassador to Great Britain (Dirksen) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsaecker) - British readiness to demand sacrifices from Czechoslovakia if Germany refrains from warlike measures.
Source: Documents on German Foreign Policy , series D, vol. II, pp.620-623.
BAD REICHENHALL, August 24, 1938
DEAR HERR VON WEIZSAECKER: Many thanks for your friendly letter of August 19 about Mr. Morgan. I shall be glad to establish contact with him from London. I am enclosing two memoranda on the British attitude toward the Czech question; they have just reached me and seem important enough to be brought to your notice, since they throw light on two points: 1) The growing British comprehension of the Czech problem. 2) The increasing British readiness to take our demands into consideration, always providing that peace be maintained. I should be very grateful if you would return these enclosures through your department after you have made copies. I am conscientiously taking the cure here, concentrating on it all the harder because of the continual rain. Owing to absence, I have not yet been able to carry out the further object of my stay here, that is, to report verbally at Obersalzberg. I hope to do this before the Party rally; it would be unpleasant if I had to reply there in the negative to a question from Henderson on the subject, particularly as Chamberlain in his private letter to me had attached so much importance to this report. Au revoir till Nuremberg! With best wishes and Heil Hitler! Yours ever,
DIRKSEN [Enclosure 1]
MEMORANDUM BY BARON VON WELCK, SECRETARY OF LEGATION (LONDON EMBASSY), ON A CONVERSATION WITH BARON HAHN, MEMBER OF THE D.N.B. OFFICE, LONDON
Baron Hahn, diplomatic correspondent of the D.N.B., called on me today and gave me the following information: He met yesterday morning at the Foreign Office, S.F. Steward, the Prime Minister's Press Chief, whom he has known for many years and who invited him to visit him in the afternoon. Steward said to him during the visit that he wanted to speak frankly. In his opinion - and he was speaking as a specialist - German propaganda was extraordinarily bad. Germany was spending a great deal of money to explain her measures and successes to the outside world, but succeeded in arousing only very little interest. Germany refused to say the one thing, which would be good propaganda, namely, that she was prepared to co-operate peacefully with the other nations. She did nothing but put forward new demands, refusing any negotiations on them or any quid pro quo . It was quite inevitable that by these methods the world was made more and more uneasy and became more and more anti-German. With regard to the Czech question, Steward observed that there could not be the least doubt that France and Great Britain would fight if Germany resorted to force. Neither France nor Great Britain desired war. He was convinced that the German Government did not want it either. The British Government were prepared to demand the most far-reaching sacrifices from Czechoslovakia if only Germany would adhere to peaceful methods in settling the Czech question. The British Government and people had no interest whatever in Czechoslovakia, other than that the affair should not end in Germany's using force. He knew for a certainty that Chamberlain had an intense desire to start conversations on the Czech question between Germany and Great Britain as soon as it was conceivably possible. He was quite indifferent as to whether these conversations took place between Lord Runciman and the German Government, or between the German Embassy and the British Government, or in some other way. If Lord Runciman received the slightest hint that the Fuehrer would like to speak to him, he would gladly take the appropriate steps. If the negotiations between Germany and Great Britain seemed to promise success, then France could participate in the side of Great Britain and Italy on that of Germany. Steward made no mention at all of Czechoslovakia's being admitted to these negotiations. Mr. Steward urgently requested Baron Hahn not to give his name - at least for the time being - in any report he might make on this conversation. If everything went well, he could be mentioned later. Baron Hahn reported on his conversation with Steward, without mentioning his name, in a private letter to Minister Aschmann. Baron Hahn reported to me, moreover, that the day before yesterday he had a conversation with Crolla, Counsellor of the Italian Embassy. Signor Crolla had made to him very much the same observations. He, too, was convinced that if Germany used force France and Great Britain would undoubtedly go to war, but that, on the other hand, Great Britain was prepared for any solution by peaceful methods. Signor Crolla merely expressed doubt whether it would be possible to hold a four-power conference on the Czech Question with the participation of Czechoslovakia.
